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RECENT CASE NOTES
cent, of the intake.2 ' However, a court desiring to uphold the acts can adopt
the attitude and language of the court in Florida 'v. McCarthy,22 where it
refused to say that the meter act was a tax measure under guise of the police
power. It explained away the over plus as "incidental revenue."
The black-letter rule is of course that the police power is the power to
regulate and may not be used for the purpose of raising revenue.23 The broad
proviso is made, however, that the fact that incidental revenue arises will
not invalidate a police measure; so long as revenues exceed costs by only
a reasonable margin the act is valid.24 Cooley says that under a police measure
a fee may be exacted which is not more than the (1) necessary or probable
expense of supplying the privilege and (2) of inspecting and regulating the
business it covers.25 Unless there can be included the cost of marking lanes,
cleaning the space, and generally maintaing the curb and pavement it is quite
difficult to get any semblance of balance between revenues from and costs of
meters. Our Indiana court allowed in one police regulation case26 recovery
of a license fee which brought great revenues to the city; the court counted
as expenses all costs resulting from the nature of the activity itself; excess
money from license fees for wagons was used to repair the streets.
Upon this last feature will probably arise the tremendous struggle. If the
court desires to invalidate the acts the writer submits that there is sufficient
authority for bringing about the desired result; on the other hand if there is
the desire to uphold the meter acts then the theory of "incidental revenue" may
well be employed. So far, only the Alabama court has given ear to this
attack;27 the Florida court hurdled the barrier. 28 What our court will do
remains to be seen upon the first test case being brought before it. W. E. 0.
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DEATH WrrHoUT IssuE-Testator devised all his realty to his wife for her life,
and subject to the wife's life estate to his adopted daughter, Olive, to have
and to hold the same for and during her natural life time only. Subject to
the aforesaid life estates, he devised the property absolutely and in fee simple
to the children of Olive, should she have any; but should she die without
children then the property is devised to his brothers and sisters or their
descendants. The widow elected to take under the law, and filed suit for
partition. The adopted daughter claims that having survived the testator,
and although she is unmarried and has no children, she takes a fee subject
only to defeasance in favor of her children upon their birth. The brothers and
sisters claim as contingent remainderman subject to the life estate of Olive
2122 Iowa L. R. 731, n. 91.
22Florida v. McCarthy (1936), 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314.
28 1 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1929), See. 27.
2 4Laundry License Case (1885), 22 F. 701; Stull v. Demattos (1900), 23
Wash. 71, 62 P. 451; State ex rel. City of Bozeman v. Police Ct. of Bozeman
(1923), 68 Mont. 436, 219 P. 810; State v. Caplan (1927), 100 Vt. 140,
135A. 705.
264 Cooley, Taxation (4th ed. 1929), Sec. 1806, n. 66.
2 o Tomlinson v. Indianapolis (1896), 144 Ind. 142, 43 N. E. 9.
27 Birmingham v. Hood-McPherson Realty Co. (1937), 233 Ala. 352, 172 So.
114.
28 Florida v. McCarthy (1936), 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314.
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and the statutory rights of the widow. Held, Olive having survived the
testator, the contingency upon which the brothers and sisters could have any
interest in the estate has terminaed. Schenck v. Schenck (Ind. App. 1939), 18
N. E. (2d) 941.
The cardinal rule in the construction of wills has always been that the
intention of the testator should control; but where words are used which
have a settled legal meaning, full effect must be givin to them.1 Another rule
which the courts-especially the Indiana courts-have used is that the testator's
intention must be given effect when clearly expressed, but if his intention is
in doubt then it is the duty of the courts to apply recognized rules of construc-
tion, even though that may result in a construction different from what the
testator had in his own mind but failed to clearly express.2 In the application
of the latter rule, the courts have given themselves practically a free hand in
deciding whether or not the intent is so clearly expressed that it is necessary
to apply rules of construction to the will.
A well established rule in Indiana is that words of survivorship, used in
disposing of an estate, are presumed to relate to the death of the testator,
rather than the death of the first taker.3 The Indiana courts have extended
this presumption to apply when there is an intermediate (particular) estate
followed by a fee with a gift over upon death without issue,4 although there
are many states holding to the contrary. 5 One effect of this presumption is
brought out in the substitutionary rule: that where real estate is devised to
one, in terms sufficient to give a fee simple, and a devise over is made, con-
ditioned upon the first taker dying without issue, the phrase "dying without
issue" is construed to refer to a death in the lifetime of the testator unless a
contrary intention is clearly expressed.6 This presumption is based on the
policy of early vesting and also on the repugnancy in the giving of an
absolute fee and then putting limitations upon it.7
Although the Indiana court has been liberal in extending the doctrine of
refering words -of death or survivorship to the lifetime of the testator, 8 it
1 Allen v. Craft (1887), 109 Ind. 476, 9 N. E. 919; Fowler v. Duhme (1895),
143 Ind. 248, 42 N. E. 623. See note in 40 West Virginia L. Q. 385.
2 Quilliam v. Union Trust Co. (1923), 194 Ind. 521, 529, 142 N. E. 214,
216. Also see Boren v. Reeves (1919), 73 Ind. App. 604, 125 N. E. 359.
3 Fowler v. Duhme (1895), 143 Ind. 248, 42 N. E. 623; Aldred v. Sylvester
(1916), 184 Ind. 542, 11 N. E. 914; Harris v. Carpenter (1887), 109 Ind. 540,
10 N. E. 422; Quilliam v. Union Trust Co. (1923), 194 Ind. 521, 530, 142 N. E.
214, 216, and cases cited therein. See Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without
Issue, 39 Yale L. J1. 332.
4 Death of child refers to death of testator, and not to death during the
particular estate. Taylor v. Stephens (1905), 165 Ind. 200, 74 N. E. 980;
Duzan v. Chappel (1907), 41 Ind. App. 651, 84 N. E. 775; Tarbell v. Smith
(1904), 125 Iowa 388, 101 N. W. 118.
5 Mayer v. Walker (1906), 214 Pa. 440, 444, 63 A. 1011, 1012; Singhi v.
Dean (1920), 119 Me. 287, 110 A. 865; White v. White's Guardian (1916),
168 Ky. 752, 754, 182 S. W. 942, 943.
6 See cases cited note 3, supra.
7 Britton v. Thorton (1884), 112 U. S. 536, 5 S. Ct. 291; Vanderzee v.
Slingerland (1886), 103 N. Y. 47, 8 N. E. 24-7. Gavit, Future Interests in
Indiana, 3 Indiana L. J1. 505, 627.
8 Wright v. Charley (1891), 129 Ind. 257, 28 N. E. 706; Hall v. Bauchert
(1917), 67 Ind. App. 201, 117 N. E. 972; Antioch College v. Branson (1896),
145 Ind. 312, 44 N. E. 314.
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has in the past limited the substitutionary rule to gifts in terms sufficient to
give a fee simple, and refused to apply the rule where the primary grant was
only a life estate. 9
Another factor to consider when there is a conveyance "to A and his heirs,
but if A die without issue to B and his heirs," is whether or not "die without
issue", means definite or indefinite failure of issue. At common law the
presumption was to construe such grants as meaning indefinite failure of issue, 10
and since indefinite failure of issue marks the termination of an estate in fee
tail, A was held to have an estate tail and B a vested remainder in fee
simple."1 Although the present trend is away from the presumption of indefinite
failure of issue, 1 2 Indiana is among the few remaining states which still clearly
follows the presumption in favor of the indefinite construction.1 3
Upon the face of it, the two theories appear to be inconsistent, but upon
close scrutiny they emerge as separate problems. The definite or indefinite
failure of issue presumption is a question of whether failure of issue means
failure by death of the named person or failure by the death either of the named
person or by the death of the last of his issue, while in the substitutionary rule
it is a question of whether the failure of issue must happen before a given
event such as the death of the testator or the death of a life tenant.1 4
In the instant case the court, imbued with the substitutionary construction,
and having a will before it that contained a "die without children" clause, ap-
plied the substitutionary rule to cut out the interests of the brothers and sisters
ONickerson v. Hoover, Admr. (1919), 70 Ind. App. 343, 115 N. E. 588.
One should note that the repugnancy theory which is one of the bases of the
substitutionary rule, wouldn't be applicable where primary grant is only a life
estate.
10 Jones v. Owens (1830), 1 Barn. & Ad. 318, 109 Eng. Repr. 805; Wyld
v. Lewis (1738), 1 Atk. 432, 26 Eng. Repr. 276. Simes, Law of Future Interests,
Sec. 335.
11 Warren, Gifts Over on Death Without Issue, 39 Yale L. Jl. 332.
12 See detailed outline of rules in the different states in Simes, Law of
Future Interests, Sec. 342. Also note in Powell, Cases on Future Interests
(second edition) p. 299.
13 Where the residue of an estate was given to B & C and if B & C
should die without issue, then their share to go back to the estate of the
testator, the Indiana Supreme Court held this a limitation over which
is not to take effect until after an indefinite failure of issue and therefbre
the gift over was in violation of the statute against perpetuities and the first
taker thereby received the residue in fee. The court defined a definite failure
of issue to be when a precise time is fixed by the will for the failure of issue,
as in the case where there is a devise to one, but if he die without lawful issue
living at the time of his death. An indefinite failure of issue was defined as the
period when the issue or descendants of the first taker shall become extinct,
and when there is no longer any issue of the grantee, without refer-
ence to any particular time or any particular event. Huxford v. Milligan
(1875), 50 Ind. 542. Compare Hall v. Brownlee (1904), 164 Ind. 238, 72
N. E. 131, which held a gift over in the case of the death of the first taker with-
out issue, expressly limited to take effect after such death, imports a definite
failure of issue at the death of the first taker and not an indefinite failure.
14 For a more detailed study and condemnation of Indiana cases dealing
with the substitutional construction see Powell, Construction of Written Instru-
ments, 14 Indiana L. J1. 397, 419. Also see proposed section of Uniform
Property Act to correct many of these constructions, 14 Indiana L. J1. 397, 424.
Simes, Law of Future Interests, Sec. 329.
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of the testator upon the survivorship of the adopted daughter after the death
of the testator. To the writer it appears that since the gift to the adopted daughter
was expressly for life only, there was a class gift to the unborn children sub-
ject to the rights of the widow and the life estate in Olive. However, since
none of the class were in existence at the time of the death of the testator,
the unborn children take a defeasible fee subject to its being defeated by a gift
over to the testator's brothers and sisters if there be no children born at Olive's
death. 1 5 Therefore, the brothers and sisters of the testator seem to have a
contingent remainder, dependent upon Olive's death without children; and the
survival by Olive of the testator should not have affected their interest. I. K.
15 Coquillard v. Coquillard (1916), 62 Ind. App. 426, 113 N. E. 474; Barres
v. Johns (1935), 261 Ky. 181, 87 S. W. (2d) 387.
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